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There is no doubt that the Iranian leaders are feeling the heat on all fronts. On the 
nuclear front the negotiations have practically stagnated, which can be translated to no 
sanctions lifting and hence no relief for the severely ailing economy. On the Syrian front 
Tehran and Hezbollah of Lebanon are the only solo ideological defenders of the falling 
Assad regime and just recently commended their "axis of resistance" with Syria. Upon 
his fall, Iran will lose a very important regional stronghold. 
 
On the economic side Western sanctions have been very damaging. They seem to have 
worked more effectively than they were expected due to significant economic 
mismanagement of the government. On the internal affairs front the increasing 
differences between the Supreme Leader camp and the Ahmadinejad camp have 
prevented the regime to adopt a unified stance against the ongoing international 
pressures. The Supreme Leader has practically eliminated the Ahmadinejad team from 
being in control of sensitive affairs such security and international matters. 
Iran’s Nuclear Dossier 
Iran and the P5+1 group, comprising the five U.N. Security Council permanent members 
plus Germany, are to hold another round of talks to discuss efforts to resolve Tehran’s 
nuclear issues after the technical expert level and deputy level talks. So far the past 
negotiations earlier this year failed to bring about desired results. What may be 
concluded from the previous negotiations is that the West is not so eager to grant 
momentous concessions to Iran such as lifting its devastating oil and financial 
sanctions, perhaps because it believes that it has an upper hand in making Iran comply 
with its conditions for any future concessions due to growing pressures on Iran’s 
economy. 
Also, it is believed that there are other purposes in dragging out the talks and preventing 
their progress. One option is that perhaps there is a link with the U.S. presidential 
elections in November. On the other hand, the Israeli and neo-conservative lobby do not 
desire any diplomatic solution to the nuclear deadlock. Since the beginning of the 
nuclear negotiations Israel has tried hard to declare that the diplomatic effort to stop 
Tehran’s enrichment of uranium is dead. This is also valid for the Iranian hardliners 
that do not want to compromise at any price with the West. If these nuclear negotiations 
fail, the possibility of an Israeli attack will become much more imminent. So far the US 
government has resisted against Israel’s pressure to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites. 
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Earlier Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak claimed that a new U.S. intelligence report 
brings Washington’s assessment closer to the Israeli intelligence community’s view that 
the Islamic Republic has made considerable progress toward military nuclear capability. 
In response, Washington indicated it had not changed its view that Iran was not yet on 
the verge of building a nuclear bomb; despite Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s statement 
that US intelligence now viewed the threat as more urgent. 
During the previous negotiations Iran demanded that the P5+1 include easing oil and 
banking sanctions among the incentives offered to Iran for a nuclear compromise, which 
the P5+1 has so far refused. As sanctions have started to take their toll largely because of 
government mismanagement of the economy, the uncompromising prolonged nuclear 
negotiations have frustrated Iran’s leaders. At the beginning of the negotiations they had 
hoped to get a fast relief on the economic sanctions to prevent their economy spiraling 
down the path of complete stagnation. 
The most important issue that surrounded these negotiations is the repetition of Iran’s 
and P5+1’s contradictory view points and the absence of the least flexibility between the 
two parties. While both groups assert hope to reach an agreement before a negotiation 
encounter; and after the negotiations proclaim optimism for the next round of 
negotiations, their discussions haven’t touched any tangible result yet. It seems that, 
however, this negotiation route will inevitably have to pass a series of obstacles such as 
the crisis in Syria and the presidential elections in the US, but still it is not known that 
whether after bypassing these obstacles what will hold for the fate of these negotiations. 
Support for Assad’s Regime 
On the Syrian side, in a recent move Tehran explained its relationship with Damascus as 
an “axis of resistance” that will not allow to be broken. Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah 
are the only ideological backers of the Assad regime although the Chinese and Russians 
also defend his regime. Syria has been an ally of the former Soviet Union and after its 
collapse continued to be a Russian ally against the West. 
Russia has enjoyed a historically strong, stable, and friendly relationship with Syria. 
Russia also maintains a naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus for its naval activities. 
After the uprising against the Assad regime more than a year ago, Moscow has held a 
strong position in support of Syria’s government and against international action 
endorsed by Western countries. 
China’s relationship with the Syrian regime isn’t all that strong or important. However, 
China is so hesitant about giving the West any leverage to over through despotic regimes 
fearing increasing Western influence on the new regimes. 
So far the Iran-Syria alliance has instigated significant challenges for Western 
diplomacy in the region. Iran and Syria are also strategically tied. Syria was the first 
country to recognize the new regime after the 1979 Iranian revolution. It was also the 
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first country to begin its political relationship with the new establishment in Iran. Both 
countries have enjoyed a very good and strong relationship for the past 3 decades. 
On the very early days of the Islamic Revolution the common regional interests and 
perspective between the two countries brought them closer together and later on 
established a strategic alliance in their relations. Their common position grew more 
when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. They collaborated to found the Lebanese militant 
group Hezbollah to combat the Israelis. Therefore, the triangle of Iran, Syria and 
Hezbollah was formed, which put Israel’s leaders in an awkward position.  
During the coming years Iran offered massive financial aids to Syria for its support of 
Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. As a result, Syria became Iran’s most important ally in 
the region. Their close relationship persisted after the war and after the death of Hafez 
Assad, when his son Bashar Assad took office. 
At present, their cooperation is broken into two dimensions. Syria plays as Iran’s 
gateway for much of its economic activity with other countries and economic support of 
militant groups such as Hezbollah, which include trade, financial aids, engineering that 
amounts to billions of dollars of economic transactions. 
The other dimension is their strategic and regional issues. Syria is Israel’s neighbor. It 
plays an important role in helping Iran’s regional influence. Iran’s staunch support for 
the Syrian regime is in line with not losing its regional stronghold against its rivals and 
enemies, i.e. Israel and some of the Arab countries. 
Iran is in very risky condition by backing the Assad regime. Iran’s support for Syria has 
helped the Assad regime maintain a brutal fight of repression against the Syrian people, 
shielding it from the full effect of international and Arab sanctions. In case of Assad’s 
fall, Iran’s regional position and economic relations will receive a heavy blow. The 
Lebanese Hezbollah’s situation will also get seriously affected. This has made Iran’s 
leaders very nervous. Due to this fact, Iran has been the periodic recipient of Syrian 
authorities and has sent its envoys to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and other regional countries 
to mediate the growing civil war.  
However, the US, the EU and their Arab allies have excluded Iran from diplomatic 
meetings on the crisis in Syria. To include itself in Syria conflict affairs, Iran recently 
hosted an emergency consultation meeting of “Syrian friends” as it calls it, in Tehran. 
Officials of 28 countries participated in the meeting to reach a solution for the bloody 
conflict in Syria. But no specific conclusion was reached during the meeting. 
The important question is whether Iran will give up its support of Assad’s regime in 
Syria, if the West at least partially lifts the sanctions and addresses Iran’s nuclear 
requests? Perhaps the support for Assad’s regime is the only key card that Iran can play 
against the West. As it appears there is a general agreement among the West and other 
Arab nations that sooner or later Assad must go. If Assad’s regime falls, it will put Iran 
in a much more difficult position. 
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Western Sanctions, Mismanagement and Economic Stagnation 
Economic Mismanagement of the government in addition to US and EU sanctions has 
severely damaged the Iranian economy. On the one hand, because of economic 
mismanagement Iran is not in a suitable position to implement economic 
accommodative policies. High unemployment–in particular among the youth, high 
inflation, massive stray liquidity, declining production, instability in the foreign 
exchange market, high imports, low exports, increasing corruption, etc., which all stem 
from adopting wrong economic policies have put Iran’s economy in a grave danger. 
Also, government monopoly, increasing entrance of state organizations such the IRGC 
(Islamic Republic Guards Corps) and state foundations in the economy have practically 
elimination competition and put the private sector in a very weak position. 
On the other hand, US, EU, and international sanctions have cutoff the banking system 
from using the international banking network SWIFT to conduct international financial 
transactions, prevented US and EU countries from buying Iranian oil, encouraged 
others for not buying and punished others from buying Iranian oil, banned EU insurers 
to insure ships carrying Iranian oil, and banned many international companies to supply 
their products to Iran. As a result, Iran will encounter a huge foreign exchange income. 
Oil accounts for about 80 percent of Iran’s foreign currency income. 
The combination of all these issues has put Iran’s economy in a very awkward situation. 
Economic costs have increased drastically. As an example, according to Ahmad 
Khorram – the former Minister of Roads and Transportation under President 
Mohammad Khatami – during the Khatami presidency the cost to execute each phase of 
the South Pars natural gas field was about $1 billion, but now it costs between $3.5 
billion to $5 billion. 
But the number of sanctions has not stopped yet. The government and US Congress are 
both busy on a regular basis to impose more sanctions. The US government in a recent 
announcement said that a new set of sanctions on Iran’s energy and petrochemical 
sectors have been imposed. The Obama administration tightened its oil-related 
sanctions against Iran. This was followed by new congressional legislation that promises 
to extend those sanctions further. With the latest restriction placed on the importing of 
Iranian oil, sanctions are now tighter than ever. The International Energy Agency just 
announced that Iranian oil production has fallen below 3 million barrels a day for the 
first time in 20 years due to US and EU sanctions. 
These sanctions along with foreign exchange policies of the past few years are 
compounding the country’s foreign exchange rate woes, sending the national currency 
falling to a record low and making dollars hard to come by. It is highly expected that 
considering much lower oil revenue this year, Iran will encounter a significant shortage 
of foreign exchange, increasing foreign exchange rates and hence deteriorating 
economic conditions. 
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At last after acknowledging the critical economic situation due sanctions, economic 
policymakers including Central Bank governor, Mahmoud Bahmani, plan to introduce a 
“resistive economy” as they call it to combat the sanctions. But they should bear this in 
mind that it is much more difficult for them to build economic infrastructure that they 
destroyed in the past few years. 
On the macroeconomic side, the new Central Bank estimates point to rising inflation. Its 
new reports indicate that the year-on-year inflation (CPI) rate has hit the 24.9% mark 
and the average annual inflation rate has reached 22.4%. Considering the nominal 
interest rate of 20% on long-term deposits, the real rates are -4.9% based on the year-
on-year inflation rate and -2.4% based on the average annual inflation rate. The same 
reports point to an 81% rise in fruit prices in one year. 
At the same time, the 9th and 10th governments have spent over half of country’s 
foreign exchange resources to control the soaring prices. Imports have absorbed $347.2 
billion of foreign exchange resources from the inauguration of the 9th government until 
the end of 1390 (March 2012). 
Iran has struggled to find a reliable customer base for its oil given international 
sanctions pressure. The recent levels suggest Tehran is receding somewhat from the 
international energy sector. OPEC in its August report said Iranian crude oil production 
in part affected a decline in overall output from the cartel. Iran saw its export options 
curtailed by sanctions imposed by the U.S. and European governments. 
The fall in Iran’s crude sales due to the recent imposed sanctions has hit Tehran with 
several challenges. Iran is producing about 2.8 million barrels a day; already lower 
about one million barrels a day since the beginning of the year. But it is exporting only 
an estimated 1.6 to 1.8 million barrels a day. The drop in Iran’s oil sales as well as lower 
oil prices will lead to much lower foreign exchange earnings this year. The figure is 
estimated $50 billion, down more than half the figure last year. This huge income loss 
means nothing but low economic growth if any, higher inflation, and higher 
unemployment. 
In addition, the surge in liquidity in the society caused by frequent withdrawals from the 
foreign exchange account (fund) and exercising pressure on the Central Bank to print 
money entail devastating consequences for the country’s economy curing which will not 
be easily possible in the future. It should have been considered alarming when liquidity 
began to rise in 2010, an omen that heralded the creation of an inflationary stagnation. 
On the other hand, government’s failure to introduce a clear economic strategy along 
with the announcement of rash decisions in interviews and speeches by the head of state 
and other authorities has caused severe economic stagnation, higher investment risks, a 
rise in unemployment, financial turbulence and outflows of capital. 
 
 
6 
www.vestamonitor.com 
 
In the ongoing economic crisis in Iran, the economic policy makers have failed to 
furnish a long-term plan to rid the economy of its structural and ideological problems. 
So far, they have only resorted to short-term responses, often hastefully, to sudden 
economic shifts in the ongoing crisis without addressing the root causes. 
Internal Conflicts 
The 33 years of the Islamic Republic never witnessed such a public disagreement 
between the leader and the president like the current public confrontation. The internal 
tensions between rival factions - supporters of the supreme leader and those of the 
president - are a hurdle to a consistent response to US and EU sanctions as well as a 
possibility of a strike on Iran’s nuclear sites. 
The dismissal of the Intelligence minister by Ahmadinejad and re-instating him 
immediately by Khamenei, the parliamentary elections on March 2, 2012, which gave a 
solid majority to the circle around the supreme leader, accusing some of the close 
friends of Ahmadinejad of being in a “current of deviation,” a term coined by his 
opponents to define a ideological movement which they say is too liberal, nationalist 
and not nearly religious enough to coexist with the conservatives, and fighting over 
Saeed Mortazavi – a controversial figure, who is accused of being involved in murdering 
four of the 2009 presidential election protesters in Kahrizak prison – for grating him the 
responsibility of the Social Security Organization of Iran by Ahmadinejad are some 
samples of power struggles between the two camps. 
There are eleven months to go before Iran’s next presidential election in June 2013. 
Until then a powerful, critical parliament will be able to limit activities of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad’s men are already excluded from the nuclear negotiation 
team and foreign affairs by Ayatollah Khamenei. There are signs that Ahmadinejad is 
being prevented from using resources over the next year to assist one of his close 
comrades to run for president. 
The embattled president thus faces a struggle to last until the end of his term in office. If 
more pressures are imposed upon him, he has stated many times that he has 
information and evidence against many in the system potentially damaging to the 
supreme-leaders supporters, which he could reveal if necessary. 
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